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Indonesia, Aceh and the Modern Nation-
State  
Anthony Reid 
Models of Nationalism and the Nation-State  
Much of the recent literature on the rise of ethno-nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe 
points to certain socio-economic factors—industrialisation, urbanisation, mobility within 
certain borders, mass education, print capitalism—which transformed Europe in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.1 The same factors have been transforming 
Southeast Asia almost a century later, as its population shifts from a predominantly rural and 
agrarian to a largely urban, industrial and educated one. As the lid of authoritarian regimes 
such as Suharto’s Indonesia is lifted and populist politics flourish, should we expect new 
forms of ethno-nationalism to begin redrawing the boundaries of Southeast Asia? Do we 
gain more insight into the likely path of a country like Indonesia by contemplating France in 
the late nineteenth century, when a post-revolutionary centralising state turned “peasants 
into Frenchmen” through education and mass communications,2 or the Hapsburg and 
Turkish empires of the same period, increasingly rent by populist nationalist movements, 
each demanding a separate nation-state? 
If the latter were the model, the twenty-first century might see a repeat in Asia of the ghastly 
history of twentieth-century Central Europe, in which a new order of ethnically 
homogeneous nation-states struggled into being at a terrible cost in warfare and the 
persecution of minorities. The fate of Marxist, post-revolutionary regimes in Moscow and 
Belgrade, which for a half-century or more prolonged imperial boundaries at the expense of 
ethno-nationalist claims, could suggest similar outcomes for post-revolutionary Indonesia 
and Burma, or eventually China.  
Twentieth-century Asian nationalisms were on the whole designed to bring about European-
style nation-states, because these had proved “the sure and attested way of attaining power 
and wealth”, as William McNeill has put it.3 But ethnic homogeneity was not part of the 
original agenda of most of these Asian nationalisms,4 and even democracy was relatively low 
on that agenda in comparison to anti-colonialism, modernisation, Western-style education 
and Marxist economics. Now that democracy and mass politics are central parts of the 
agenda, will ethnic homogeneity prove a necessary accompaniment? Must Asians undergo 
similar traumas before emerging with the kind of nation-states that western Europeans had 
by 1945? If so, they are in for a very rough century, and Indonesia (along with countries such 
as Burma, India and Pakistan) will be as doomed as the Austro-Hungarian empire. This 
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possibility seemed very real to Indonesians and others as they contemplated the upheavals in 
the Balkans and experienced their own painful democratisation in the 1990s. Many 
Indonesianists began to think about this previously unthinkable future for Indonesia.  
On the other hand, international conditions have changed greatly in the past century, and 
chiefly in the direction of a post-nationalist globalised order. In this new world, might 
national sovereignty have so little meaning that people will no longer die for it? Rather, from 
Palestine to Chechnya and Ayodhya, is twenty-first century political violence motivated 
rather by newly imagined global communities and in reaction to globally demonised enemies? 
Southeast Asia is an important place to ponder these questions, because like Europe it 
represents one of the crumpled extremities of the Eurasian land-mass where empires failed 
to unify and pluralisms remain intense. So far, the borders of its states, however, are those 
created by foreign imperialisms, and not by the kind of mass politics, ethnic competition and 
warfare which created the nation-states of Europe. Nor do Southeast Asian borders have any 
of the antiquity of those between China and its former tributaries in Korea and Vietnam, 
where more than a thousand years of bureaucratic government have built the most stable 
(though far from peaceful) borders in the world. The rest of pre-colonial Southeast Asia is a 
world where we can speak historically of cultural cores, or mandalas of influence, but not of 
borders. Let me now turn to the particular case of Indonesia. 
Indonesia and the Nation-State  
I have argued elsewhere that the political genius of the archipelago in the long term has been 
the way complex cultural communities were formed and sustained by something other than 
central military/bureaucratic power—be it kinship networks, market cycles, charismatic 
kings, sacred sites or the “theatre” of ritual. The intense pluralities and mutualities of such 
systems may have allowed for much low-level violence and contestation, or in places even 
required it. Yet, the attractions of flexibility and freedom in such a system seemed to 
outweigh the disadvantages of instability. It was not because Indonesians were unaware of 
bureaucratic states that they persevered with their looser systems, since they had interacted 
with the mother of all bureaucracies, China, since at least the thirteenth century. In the 
sixteenth century, Chinese chroniclers still spoke of these southern barbarians (man and yi) 
as inherently antithetic to states—“Like the birds and beasts, without human morality.”5 
Malay texts of the same period seem to acknowledge the power of Chinese bureaucracy but 
to rejoice in the proverbial agility of weak-state southerners in outmanoeuvring the great 
behemoth through sheer trickery.6  
For at least the past decade, one of the thrusts of new history-writing about pre-colonial 
Indonesia has been to explore the fascinating absence of states in our modern sense of 
military and police power, law and bureaucracy. If I may quote myself: 
In Indonesia the state has always been essentially coastal and sustained by foreign 
resources, while the highlands have been miracles of statelessness, tenuously held 
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together by kinship systems and ritual obligations rather than bureaucracy…. So 
persistently has each step towards stronger states in the archipelago arisen from 
trading ports, with external aid and inspiration, that one is inclined to seek the 
indigenous political dynamic in a genius for managing without states.7  
David Henley took me to task in a recent publication, for implying that this semi-
statelessness was a preferred condition, whereas his evidence, especially from northern 
Sulawesi before 1900, appeared to show an eagerness to escape from the uncertainties of 
statelessness once a Dutch presence provided an alternative.8 He may be onto something 
here. There were certainly Indonesian societies which behaved this way, even including the 
Balinese, who fought dramatically to the point of ritual suicide against the new Dutch order, 
and yet appeared to accept peacefully the notion of a Dutch referee for their conflicts once 
the war was lost. The low state or magical state phenomena we keep finding in Indonesia 
may be imposed as much by environmental factors as by cultural preference. Port rulers who 
could generate bureaucratic power from the wealth of maritime trade, of whom the Dutch 
were the most important, were often seen as a necessary evil or perhaps even a good. I will 
return to this issue in the case of the successor Indonesian state. 
The kind of description of pre-colonial society which set historians off in this direction is 
well reflected by Stamford Raffles’ description of the Sumatran societies he encountered 
from his base in Bencoolen: 
Sumatra is, in a great measure, peopled by innumerable petty tribes, subject to no 
general government…. At present the people are as wandering in their habits as the 
birds of the air, and until they are congregated and organised under something like 
authority, nothing can be done with them.9 
Lest this seem an extreme “stateless” example, one might explore the internal workings of 
polities generally taken by the outside world to be hierarchic monarchies, such as those of 
the Bugis in South Sulawesi. In fact these were wonderfully complex contractual alliances 
between lineages, where at the enthroning of each new king (in Wajo) the constituting 
lineage chiefs would ritually declare, “I will conduct my own affairs, I will preserve my 
manners, I will maintain my custom, only if I need it will I appeal to your advice.”10  
Older writers sometimes consigned to a little-understood Weberian “charisma” this curiously 
different Southeast Asian understanding of how power worked. Indonesianists of my 
generation have been particularly indebted, however, to their two most influential gurus—
Benedict Anderson and Clifford Geertz—who began to look at the phenomenon more 
carefully in the 1970s and 1980s, initially cooperatively.11 Anderson’s influential 1972 essay 
famously contrasted a Javanese idea of power, “that intangible, mysterious and divine energy 
which animates the universe”, to a more abstract understanding in the modern West.12 
Subsequently, Geertz published Negara in 1980, perhaps his most influential book among 
historians at large, though irritating to Bali-scholars. On the largely historical evidence of 
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nineteenth-century Bali (supplemented of course by his fieldwork in the 1960s) he developed 
the paradigm of the “theatre state”, 
In which the kings and princes were the impresarios, the priests the directors, and 
the peasants the supporting cast, stage crew and audience…. Court ceremonialism 
was the driving force of the court politics; and mass ritual was not a device to shore 
up the state, but rather the state, even in its final gasp, was a device for the 
enactment of mass ritual. Power served pomp, not pomp power.13 
As happens all too often, the historians then began to elaborate the trail blazed by a political 
scientist and an anthropologist. If Geertz had found the key to what pre-colonial Indonesian 
politics were about in theatrical state ritual, Wolters found it in the way Southeast Asian 
“men of prowess” appropriated Hindu concepts of the sacred.14 Anthony Milner found in 
Malay texts evidence that the purchase of “ceremonial rulers” around the Straits of Malacca 
was modest but real.15 Writing in the 1990s, Jane Drakard (for Minangkabau) explained 
kingly power in terms of the charismatic power of the written word; Luc Nagtegal (for Java) 
and Henk Schulte Nordholt (for Bali) in terms of unstable competing networks of kinship 
and ritual; Merle Ricklefs (for Java) and Margaret Wiener (for Bali) in magical ritual means of 
weaving, or at least asserting, coherence and unity. Finally, Leonard Andaya argued for 
Maluku that its political system required carefully balanced dualities and quadripartite 
division, which warred with each other even while recognising each other’s indispensability 
to the system.16 
While all these writers used the abundant Dutch evidence of the seventeenth to nineteenth 
centuries to document Indonesian political styles, others were in a parallel way demolishing 
the myth that the ancient states of which less was known had been powerful “empires” 
before the modern period of decline. Indonesian nationalism had, of course, been 
particularly excited by the European discovery in the period 1890–1920 of the Javanese 
kingdom of Majapahit (which flourished in the fourteenth century) and the Sumatran one of 
Sriwijaya (more amorphously potent from seventh to twelfth centuries). But Jan Christie has 
systematically shown how decentred Majapahit and all other Javanese “kingdoms” were. 
“Political ties and tax rights in Java tended, over time, to devolve into somewhat unstable 
and territorially unfocussed chains of patron-client ties, as tax-collecting authority, like 
everything else, tended to subdivide rather than accumulate.”17 Wolters, Manguin and others 
similarly laboured to make sense of the relative absence of temple remains at what was 
believed to be the heart of Sriwijaya, preferring a loose model of shifting trade centres and 
sacred or magical sites.18 
Riding as I have on these many attempts to grapple with the elusive “otherness” of 
statehood in Southeast Asia, Tony Day has produced the first attempt to synthesise and 
interpret the new work on a Southeast Asian scale—though the scheme works best for 
Indonesia (and not at all for Singapore and Vietnam). His Fluid Iron helpfully rejects any 
traditional/modern or indigenous/external dichotomies of state. Rather, he categorises the 
different theories about how power was managed and society made to cohere in terms of 
four themes, all of which survive in contemporary Indonesia. The first is kinship, 
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encompassing both familiar kinship ties and the gendered and hierarchic imagery of family, 
love and paternalism. The second is the role of knowledge, particularly outside knowledge, in 
cosmological sources of power, which he insists, “continue to exist until this very day, even 
in Marxist writings”.19 Bureaucracy qualifies as Day’s third category, even though he takes 
the rather strong position that “Even in its most authoritarian and totalitarian forms, the 
Southeast Asian state is closer to anarchy than to statehood in a Weberian sense.”20 Yet 
“bureaucratic polity” arguments remain prominent in the literature of colonial and post-
colonial polities. What is it, Day asks, “that looks like a bureaucracy, in early as well as 
contemporary times, but is not one, according to a Weberian definition”.21 The missing glue 
the first three categories fail to provide is to be found in Day’s fourth category, state violence 
and terror, still “the primary ‘sanctioning capacity’ of the modern Southeast Asian nation-
state”.22 
The debate continues. While appreciating Day’s emphasis on hybridities and subtle 
interactions over time between his four themes, I continue to see foreign-ness as essential to 
the purchase enjoyed by both his second and third categories.23 In pre-colonial, inland and 
upland Indonesia, processes of fragmentation and balance prevented economic power from 
accumulating, while maintaining socio-cultural interactions of various kinds that maintained 
the high culture. More bureaucratically or militarily powerful states always drew their wealth, 
power and legitimation from the outside through trade, like the Muslim gunpowder empires 
of Aceh, Makasar and Banten. By far the greatest such concentration of power was the 
Dutch East India Company (VOC), which in many areas made such a mark that its 
successor, the Dutch colonial state of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, continued to 
be known as the kumpeni. Before 1900 the great majority of Indonesians experienced the 
modern bureaucratic state as an external and alien phenomenon to be negotiated around, 
even if it was sometimes useful.  
The modern sense of state, as an entity monopolising the legal use of force within fixed 
boundaries, came unusually late to the Indonesian archipelago. It came, moreover, at Dutch 
hands. Only in the few years before and after 1900 did the Dutch abandon the elaborate 
process of signing hundreds of diverse treaties with local rulers through whom they would 
attempt to rule, in favour of short, sharp declarations (korte verklaring) that: 
territory X forms a part of Netherlands India and thereby stands under the 
sovereignty of the Netherlands….  And I will follow all commands that are or shall 
be given to me by or on behalf of the Governor-General or His representative.24  
From the point when Van Heutsz, Idenburg and Colijn imposed this declaration throughout 
the archipelago in the first decade of the twentieth century, all Indonesians encountered 
some elements of the modern nation-state—a monopoly of force, single currency and 
unified market, uniform bureaucratic and military structures and the beginning of a unitary 
education system. But of course other key elements of the nation state were not encouraged 
by the colonial system, including mass education, political mobilisation and the welding of 
common consciousness through symbolic representation. Given the extent of indirect rule 
through myriad rajas and sultans, the Netherlands Indies in several respects never reached 
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even the degree of common consciousness of the absolutist states of seventeenth-century 
Europe, or perhaps China of the Ming and Qing dynasties. This imagining of community 
was of course the task of nationalism. Under the Japanese occupation and during the 
revolution, in the hands of Sukarno, nationalism did achieve an astonishing if unstable 
invention of national consciousness. Finally, under Suharto’s 33-year regime it did really 
appear to many observers that this consciousness was creating stable roots through sustained 
manipulation of education, indoctrination classes (P4) and the controlled media.25 
Nevertheless the Indonesian state remained a successor of the alien and imposed colonial 
one, and constantly resorted to force and censorship to impose itself. Some, including 
Anderson in the 1980s, tended to see it as an artificial and necessarily authoritarian successor 
of Netherlands India, with little indigenous life in it.26 I too had been questioning, before 
Suharto’s fall and Timor’s independence, whether true mass nationalism was in the past or 
the future of states like Indonesia.27 I thought we should be looking carefully at potential 
ethno-nationalisms in Indonesia and elsewhere to see whether any of these were likely to tear 
the fabric of the post-colonial plural autocracies under new conditions of popular 
democracy. However, the lectures I gave in 1996 and 1997, largely based on fieldwork in 
northern Sumatra in 1995, took the view that conditions were unfavourable for the breakup 
of Indonesia into populist ethno-nationalist states. The reasons were essentially twofold: 
 Internally, Indonesia was urbanising into inherently plural, “Indonesian” cities, leaving 
very few large cities which could serve as hothouses for ethnonationalism (as Budapest, 
Prague or Zagreb did in the Austrian empire). I was astonished, for example, at the high 
proportions (over 90 per cent) of my student sample in Medan who said that they spoke 
Indonesian not only to each other but to their parents. At the same time, my surveys 
showed exceptionally high rates of education and outmigration from three rural Batak 
villages. Although I spent only a few days in Aceh during that fieldwork, this experience 
did not dissuade me from the conclusion that nineteenth-century France was a better 
parallel for contemporary Indonesia than Austro-Hungary.  
 Externally, the world is now so integrated economically and in communications that 
much of the point of independence struggles is removed, and the international 
community has become less tolerant of them, while the need for internal cultural 
homogeneity is lessened.  
Since Suharto’s fall in May 1998, the pressures of democratisation at a time of drastic 
economic downturn have of course been extremely destabilising, and pressure to break up 
Indonesia into smaller and possibly more homogeneous units grew much faster than anyone 
could have imagined. After the radical shift in opinion in Aceh during 1999, I paid two more 
brief visits there (January 2000 and January 2003), which required severe rethinking of these 
earlier conclusions. But for most of Indonesia I want to modify rather than abandon them. 
Indigenous society’s very resistance to rational/bureaucratic states in the past has made the 
externally-imposed colonial/Indonesian state more necessary today. The long-term pattern is 
still for the Indonesian state and mass media to turn the archipelago’s peoples into 
Indonesians, similar enough in their educated and popular use of the Indonesian language to 
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create a moral community. Democratisation, however, entails an overdue lowering of 
expectations about how the myths and emotions of Indonesian unity are translated as 
political uniformity and loyalty. Increasingly in a globalised world, “Indonesia” becomes the 
frame or window through which global forces are embraced, rather than the wall to keep it 
out. 
In short, most Indonesians outside Java experienced “state” in its modern sense only in the 
form of an alien imposition, the kumpeni, through the last century. This was liberating for 
some, oppressive for others. Within a generation of its imposition, however, this concept of 
state became firmly associated with modernity, progress and power. Nationalism sought to 
invent an “Indonesian” face for it. Within a single decade of the 1940s, the magic was 
effected of making this appear the only valid concept of state, endowed with a great deal of 
passion and rhetoric. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, it proved impossible to maintain 
this novel and once-alien concept except with increasing levels of force. Nevertheless, the 
archipelago has maintained, better than most contemporary places, viable non-state systems 
of cultural coherence. It seems likely both that many of them will remain, and that the only 
modern state positioned above them as a mediator of international forces will continue to be 
something like the Indonesian state, the descendant of the kumpeni. 
Aceh’s Anomalous Position 
What then is the particular problem of Aceh and Papua? Historically, the reasons are as 
opposite as their locations in the archipelago. In terms of my theme, the central anomaly of 
Aceh is the way it was defined by a state; while the central anomaly of Papua is that it 
experienced neither a state, until the very late (1920s) Dutch conquest, nor a common 
culture of the type that united stateless societies like the Batak and Minangkabau. While this 
difference makes Acehnese more likely than Papuans to relate effectively to their own state, 
there are of course international factors which lean much more in Papua’s direction. Let me 
focus henceforth on Aceh. 
I mentioned above that the more bureaucratically powerful states were always sustained and 
legitimated by outside forces, such as trade, technology and religion. At least three of 
Indonesia’s modern ethnicities, Aceh, Makasar and Banten, were in fact created by 
gunpowder empires of the same name in the “age of commerce”. The Makasar and Banten 
states, however, were conquered and demoralised by the Dutch in 1669 and 1684, 
respectively. In Banten’s case, a client sultan survived into the nineteenth century, and 
enough memory of state remained to motivate the successful 1998 movement for a separate 
Banten Province. The misfortune of the Makasarese in these terms was that their capital 
became the centre of Dutch and later Indonesian power in Sulawesi, and hence other 
ethnicities came to dominate it. Aceh is virtually alone as an identity explicitly formed by a 
state over four centuries, the memory of which was still vigorous in the twentieth. For 
Acehnese, it was the Dutch/Indonesian state that appeared the more artificial, with only a 
century of heavily contested occupancy of the territory. 
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Besides this central relation to the state, there are some other historically distinctive features 
of Aceh, which may be summarised as follows.  
1. Firstly, until the Dutch conquest in the late nineteenth century, Aceh’s diplomatic and 
economic linkages were to the Indian Ocean and the Malayan Peninsula, not to the Java 
Sea world dominated by first Java and then the Dutch. It was part of the Indian Ocean 
Islamic œcumene ever since Pasai was visited and described by Ibn Battuta in the 
fourteenth century. Aceh’s “tribute” to Ottoman Turkey in the period 1538–6828 was as 
natural in this connection as was that of Java to Ming China in the fifteenth century. 
2. Secondly, Aceh’s pepper production, first in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and 
again in the period 1800–70, when the sultanate provided half the world’s supply, gave it 
strong trade links to Turkey, India, England, the United States, France and Italy, all of 
which were appealed to diplomatically at some time. From about 1850 trade was 
reorganised through entrepôts on the regular steamer route, so that Penang became for 
Aceh “the gateway to the world; yes, the world itself”, according to Snouck Hurgronje in 
1893. “Exclusively on the experience of Acehnese in Penang rests the general conviction 
in Aceh that the rule of the English would be infinitely preferable to ours.”29 
3. The sultanate was particularly active internationally in the period 1868–74, as Dutch 
determination to round out its claims to Sumatra became increasingly clear. Britain had 
signed a treaty of protection and alliance with Aceh in 1819 (through Stamford Raffles), 
and in handing over its rights to Sumatra to the Dutch in 1824 had consequently 
required that Aceh’s independence be respected. This guarantee was waived by Britain in 
1871 in return for Dutch concessions in West Africa, and the Dutch immediately 
thereafter began to bully Aceh into recognition of Dutch sovereignty. In consequence, 
Aceh renewed an active policy of seeking alliances with Turkey, France, Britain, Italy and 
the United States. It was Acehnese contacts with the US consul, in particular, that gave 
the Dutch war party the opportunity to propel Holland into a war for which it was 
astonishingly ill-prepared. 
4. Acehnese pride in this distinct past took shape in the extremely bitter resistance to the 
Dutch of 1873–1914, the last part of which was focused in the Gayo area, ethnically 
distinct but sufficiently associated with the sultanate to resist heroically in its name. In 
total about 100,000 people died through war and attendant disruption on the Acehnese 
side, as against about 16,000 on the Dutch side.30 Even at the most peaceful moment of 
the Dutch occupation, the 1930s, the Dutch governor could warn that every Acehnese 
nourished “a fanatical love of freedom, reinforced by a powerful sense of race, with a 
consequent contempt for foreigners and hatred for the infidel intruder”, so that a 
constant display of superior force was the only thing which kept Dutch rule intact 
there.31 One should never underestimate the readiness of Acehnese to sacrifice for this 
national pride. 
5. Rebellions have been a constant theme, in every decade of the twentieth century. The 
periodic anti-Dutch rebellions of the 1920s and 1930s culminated in early 1942, as a 
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Japanese invasion became imminent. An uprising forced the Dutch to abandon Aceh 
before any Japanese had landed—the only place where this happened. And although the 
insurgent Acehnese then welcomed the Japanese, by 1944 there was another rebellion, 
among the bloodiest in wartime Indonesia, against the Japanese military. The rebellions 
against Jakarta’s control under Teungku Daud Beureu’eh (who had been the most 
influential ulama and revolutionary leader of 1945–50) in 1953–62, and the then little-
known Hasan Tiro since 1976, left relatively short periods of the twentieth century 
during which Aceh was not disturbed by rebellion against Jakarta. 
6. The specific idea of an Acehnese state was never far from the minds of those opposing 
the Jakarta status quo in Aceh. Until his submission to the Dutch in 1903, the “pretender 
sultan”, Tuanku Muhammad Daud, had been at the heart of resistance for forty years. In 
1938–40 the groups most dissatisfied with the power of the ulèëbalang aristocracy in 
Aceh, notably including many reformist ulama, rallied behind the idea of a restored 
sultanate.32 During the anti-Dutch revolution of 1945–49 these same groups shifted to 
supporting the Indonesian Republic and seized the opportunity to eliminate their 
ulèëbalang rivals, a few of whom were pro-Dutch. Aceh was a model of resistance to all 
ideas emanating from the Dutch in this contested period, including federalism, though in 
practice Acehnese had no need of federal safeguards since they were fully in control of 
Aceh. Daud Beureu’eh’s 1953 rebellion was overtly to support not an independent Aceh, 
but an Indonesian Islamic state (NII) for which he believed Aceh had fought in the 
revolution. Nevertheless, two years later, a separate Negara Bahagian Aceh (Aceh federal 
state) was established by the rebels through the Batee Kureng Declaration of 23 
September 1955, under a powerful Wali Negara or head of state (Daud Beureu’eh 
himself), a prime minister and a cabinet.33 
The different way in which Acehnese have experienced being part of a state in the past does 
not in itself mean they cannot live within the bounds of an Indonesian state. Aceh has had 
two important elites in the past century, the Islamic-educated and the state-educated. In 1945 
enough of both elites, including the young Hasan Tiro himself, enthusiastically supported the 
Indonesian Republic to carry the day against some of the Dutch-educated ulèëbalang who 
wanted to defend the established order. The new history developed by Hasan Tiro in the 
1970s and becoming popular after 1998, is wide of the mark in claiming that, after the 
Japanese surrender, Aceh “was turned over by the Dutch to the Javanese—their 
mercenaries—by hasty fiat of colonial powers”, and that Acehnese had no part in this 
transition.34 It may be true that the rural majority of Aceh’s population had not been 
effectively socialised as Indonesians by the 1940s, but Tiro’s generation of educated youth 
threw themselves enthusiastically onto the Indonesian side, taking their mentors like Daud 
Beureu’eh with them.  
Indeed, Aceh has a particularly central historical relationship to two factors—Islam and the 
Malay/Indonesian language—which help to make Indonesia coherent. A Malay-language, 
Southeast Asian variant of Islam was first developed in Pasai (near modern Lhokseumawe) 
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and was given literary substance in Aceh in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries through such writers as Hamzah Fansuri, Nuruddin ar-
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Raniry, and Abdurra’uf of Singkel or Syiah Kuala (the last two being celebrated in the names 
of Aceh’s two universities).  
Acehnese appear to have written in Malay as far back as they were able to write, and all the 
early Acehnese texts are in that language or Arabic. Only in the late seventeenth century does 
there begin to be evidence of writing in Acehnese, which remained for the most part a 
language of speech and recitation. The Aceh linguist Mark Durie has described the Acehnese 
texts which were written in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as being “framed” in a 
context of Malay and Arabic, whereby the beginning and end of texts were in Malay, with an 
Arabic exordium.35 Durie believes there has never been “an established tradition of 
instruction in reading and writing Acehnese”—those who could recite Acehnese texts to an 
audience had already learned to read through Malay and Arabic.36 Despite the considerable 
effort since 1999 to publish Acehnese dictionaries and writings and to press for its use in 
schools, Acehnese are wedded to Malay/Indonesian in a fundamental way.  
On the other hand, Hasan Tiro exposed a vulnerable nerve when he attacked the viability of 
the Indonesian state concept.  
Indonesia’ is merely a new label, in a totally foreign nomenclature … to replace the 
despicable ‘Dutch East Indies’ in an attempt to unite the administration of their ill-gotten 
far-flung colonies…. If Dutch colonialism was wrong, then Javanese colonialism which was 
squarely based on it cannot be right.37  
The emotional and moral capital invested in the Republik Indonesia concept in the period 
1945–98 created expectations of conformity that the colonial state had never imagined and 
the independent one could only appear to deliver through violence and often terror.  
A more matter-of-fact acceptance of the state as a necessary and convenient window to the 
modern world can live more comfortably with diversity, anomalies and even rivals. The 
Indonesian government’s acceptance of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding of 15 
August 2005 was a remarkable step towards pragmatism on this front. The agreement itself 
departed radically from the centralised unitary state so dear to both Sukarno and Suharto, by 
allowing for the position of Wali Nanggroe (a head of state by another name), “regional 
symbols including a flag, a crest and a hymn”, and full self-government in all areas not 
reserved to Jakarta, i.e. “foreign affairs, external defence, national security, monetary and 
fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion”.38 In principle this was a completely new 
departure towards pragmatically asymmetric government, in which one constituent of the 
Republic has considerably more legal autonomy than others. Such arrangements are familiar 
in federal Malaysia and Canada, and long accepted in the United Kingdom, but go against the 
grain in post-revolutionary centralised republics such as Indonesia.39 Nationalists within the 
Indonesian parliament and military, as well as conservatives within its bureaucracy, have 
means to negate the agreement which ended the long-festering rebellion. Nevertheless, at the 
time of writing, a year after the first locally elected governor of Aceh took office in February 
2007, there was reason for optimism. A democratic Indonesia has made giant steps towards 
accepting a more realistic sense of what the imperial successor state can do. 
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